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ABSTRACT 
We study cyber conflict as a two-person, zero-sum game in discrete time, where each 
player discovers new exploits according to an independent random process. Upon 
discovery, the player must decide if and when to exercise a munition based on that 
exploit. The payoff from using the munition is a function of time that is (generally) 
increasing. These factors create a basic tension: the longer a player waits to exercise a 
munition, the greater his payoff because the munition is more mature, but also the greater 
the chance that the opponent will also discover the exploit and nullify the munition. 
Assuming perfect knowledge, and under mild restrictions on the time-dependent payoff 
function for a munition, we derive optimal exercise strategies and quantify the value of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Conflict in cyberspace is difficult to analyze; methods developed for other 
dimensions of conflict, such as land warfare, war at sea, and missile warfare, do not 
adequately address cyber conflict. A characteristic that distinguishes cyber conflict is that 
actors do not know the true state of their arsenal(s)—i.e., an opponent may negate a 
potential attack by discovering and fixing the vulnerability in their system; they may do 
this without knowledge of their adversary’s intentions. 
Our analysis focuses on the National level, with decisions and actions that would 
be available to a Unified Commander. This is fundamentally different than analyses that 
are focused on the defense of a specific technological system. 
In this report, we develop a rigorous game-theoretic description of two players 
and a single vulnerability. We do so under an assumption of perfect information, in the 
sense that as soon as a player discovers a vulnerability he knows with certainty if the 
adversary has also discovered it. We consider the decisions facing a Commander with 
limited resources who has a single decision: Upon discovering vulnerability, he may: 
 Wait: Waiting increases the damage of a munition based on the 
vulnerability; however, it also risks the adversary’s discovery of the 
vulnerability, negating the munitions’ effectiveness. 
 Attack: Attacking exercises an available munition. 
From these assumptions, we gain the following insights: 
 Success requires rapid action. Our model shows that delays in taking 
action reduce the chance of a player’s success in cyber conflict. Such 
delays can come from a variety of sources, including bureaucratic or 
command restrictions. A byproduct of our model is the calculation of how 
proficient a player must be in other areas to make up for delays in taking 
action; in most cases, the required capability is unattainable. The 
immediate consequence of this is that command structures in cyberspace 
should be agile with the correct level of delegation of authority. 
 Prospects for deterrence in cyber conflict may be limited. The ability of 
players to deter their opponents from attacking depends on an assured 
second strike. In cyber conflict, opposing players may have munitions 
based on the same exploit, and the first player to use the exploit effectively 
removes second strike munitions from the opponent’s arsenal. 
Complicating factors to the cyber conflict game, such as an inability to 
identify the player who performed a cyber attack, or a player’s ability to 
respond with kinetic munitions, also have an effect on deterrence in  
cyber conflict. 
The framework contained herein not only informs the decision facing a 
commander in conflict, but also allows for exploratory analysis—particularly in the  
 xiv
trade-offs between speed of detection and speed of attack development. Therefore, this 
model may be useful for both cyber warriors and budget analysts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conflict in Cyberspace, or cyber conflict, is important at both the strategic and 
tactical levels. In this paper, we consider the strategic decisions made by states or other 
groups about when and how to engage in cyber conflict. The increasing dependency on 
interconnected networks, both in military and civilian life, means that little is beyond the 
reach of cyberspace. Cyberspace plays a central role in our social, economic, and civic 
welfare. It is, therefore, not surprising that the United States “has identified cyber security 
as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” 
(National Security Council, 2010). Consequently, security and defense in cyberspace has 
become an increasingly large part of the defense budget (Stervstein, 2011). 
A defining characteristic of cyber conflict is the way in which weapons in 
cyberspace are discovered, developed, and employed. Players search for mechanisms that 
can cause cyber systems to perform in ways not intended in their original design, called 
exploits, and, once found, develop them into one or more cyber munitions. These 
munitions can then be used as part of a cyber attack. In searching for exploits to use 
against an adversary, a player may also discover flaws in their own system and decide to 
patch them so an adversary cannot use them. Moreover, a player could develop munitions 
based on an exploit that the adversary independently fixes, thereby making the munitions 
obsolete. Thus, collections of cyber munitions, or arsenals, are dynamic and their 
effectiveness depends on the relative state of knowledge of the opponents. 
In this context, apparently simple questions such as “how long should we hold a 
munition in development before using it in an attack?” and “how should we allocate 
limited resources to offense versus defense?” require novel, analytical models. Moreover, 
the dynamic nature of cyber weapons development and obsolescence makes it difficult to 
assess the potency of an arsenal; this is true for assessing our own arsenal as well as an 
arsenal belonging to an adversary. Clear, useful analysis at the national level is important 
both for making sound future investment decisions and for creating informed strategic 
and policy guidance. 
To analyze the strategic decisions involved in cyber conflict, we use a game 
theoretic framework—we view cyber warfare as a game consisting of attacks that 
opposing players exercise at a time of their choosing. Each player discovers, develops, 
and chooses to exercise attacks to maximize the value of their cyber operations. Our 
analysis is independent of specific technologies, and does not assume an explicit cyber 
system or exploit. 
Using minimal assumptions, our model leads to two fundamental insights: 
 Success requires rapid action. Our model shows that delays in taking 
action reduce the chance of a player’s success in cyber conflict. Such 
delays can come from a variety of sources, including bureaucratic or 
command restrictions. A byproduct of our model is the calculation of how 
proficient a player must be in other areas to make up for delays in taking 
action; in most cases, the required capability is unattainable. The 
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immediate consequence of this is that command structures in cyberspace 
should be agile with the correct level of delegation of authority. 
 Prospects for deterrence in cyber conflict may be limited. The ability of 
players to deter their opponents from attacking depends on an assured 
second strike. In cyber conflict, opposing players may have munitions 
based on the same exploit, and the first player to use the exploit effectively 
removes second strike munitions from the opponent’s arsenal. 
Complicating factors to the cyber conflict game, such as an inability to 
identify the player who performed a cyber attack, or a player’s ability to 
respond with kinetic munitions, also have an effect on deterrence in  
cyber conflict. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
The JASON 2010 report, The Science of Cyber-Security (JASON, 2010), 
recommends a variety of analytic approaches and suggests borrowing ideas from other 
sciences such as physics, cryptography, and biological sciences, including epidemiology. 
The JASON report introduces a two-player, stationary, discrete-time model called the 
Forwarder’s Dilemma as an example of what a game-theoretic analysis might look like. 
This game considers whether an administrator should forward another system’s messages 
on their network and is similar both in format and solution to the well-known Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (e.g. Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). Lye and Wing (2002) and Shen, Chen, Blasch, 
and Tadda (2007) also consider cyber attacks in the context of a game. The most 
comprehensive survey of game theory and cyberspace is by Shiva, Dasgupta, and Wu 
(2010). They develop a taxonomy of game theoretic models with two broad categories: 
 Static versus Dynamic. A “one shot” cyber conflict game, where players 
choose plans of action and then execute them simultaneously, is a static 
game. A cyber conflict game with multiple stages and sequential decisions 
is a dynamic game. 
 Available Information. Players may have exact, imperfect, or no 
knowledge about their opponent’s intentions or capabilities. If the players 
know the actions of other players once taken, this is called a game with 
perfect information. If the players know the structure of the game and 
payoffs, but not the actions, this is called a game with complete 
information. Finally, a game in which the payoffs evolve in time in a 
random process is a stochastic game. 
While game theory considers both cooperative and noncooperative games, work 
to date on cyber conflict deals only with noncooperative games. In the taxonomy of Shiva 
et al. (2010) our proposed model is a noncooperative, dynamic, stochastic game with 
perfect information. 
The previous study that has the most commonality with our approach is that of 
Lye and Wing (2002). They consider a two-player, stochastic game between an attacker 
and administrator. Their model is at the machine level; it focuses on an attacker 
attempting to find the best policy among a portfolio of several attacks to damage a 
university computer network. This game theoretic model of Lye and Wing maps to the 
tactical level of conflict, as opposed to our model that is focused at the strategic level 
between two players engaged in cyber conflict. 
Our work differs from previous work by abstracting cyber conflict away from 
individual machines and instruction sets in the same manner that Lanchester equations 
(Washburn & Kress, 2009) abstract physical conflict away from soldiers and weapons. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a foundation from which to build more complex 
models, towards the ultimate goal of integrating the cyber domain into the spectrum of 





























As defined previously, a computer system may contain exploits. These are 
unknown until discovered, after which they can be fixed in the form of a patch or 
weaponized into a munition. We model the life-cycle of a single cyber exploit as a  
four-stage process. 
1. Discovery of the Exploit 
We model the discovery of a single exploit by each player as a random process, 
occurring independently for each player, which may depend on factors such as training, 
investment, experience and luck. 
2. Development of Munition 
Once an exploit is discovered, a player can develop a munition based on the 
exploit. We assume that there is a relationship between the length of time that a player 
knows about an exploit and the effectiveness of the munition he develops based on that 
exploit. Munitions may only be developed for known exploits. 
3. Employment 
Once a munition is developed, it can be employed at will against an adversary in 
an attack. 
4. Obsolescence 
Consider a game between two players, Player 1 and Player 2. If Player 1 discovers 
an exploit in his system and patches it before Player 2 can develop and employ a 
munition based on that exploit, then that munition becomes obsolete. 
Uncertainties about the obsolescence of a player’s own arsenal are a key 
dimension in the analysis of cyber conflict. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume 
that a player who is aware of an exploit also knows whether the other player(s) are aware 
of the same exploit; this removes one type of uncertainty. For a player who is unaware of 
an exploit, we assume neither player knows the time until the unaware player discovers 
the exploit. This uncertainty in discovery times is the fundamental tension that our model 
seeks to explore. 
We model cyber warfare as a Markov game (Thie, 1983; Fudenberg & Tirole, 
1991) where the choices available to each player depend on the number of exploits 
known by each player and the strength of each player’s munitions. In general, there may 
be multiple exploits that each player discovers, develops into munitions, and uses to 
attack, but we choose to focus our analysis on a scenario where there is only a single 
exploit to be discovered. At the beginning of this scenario, neither player knows the 
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exploit. Each player probabilistically discovers the exploit, and when either player 
chooses to attack, then payoffs are determined and the game terminates. 
B. FORMULATION 
Our model focuses on a strategic cyber conflict between two players, where there 
is a single exploit to be discovered. Let i index the players {1, 2}i . The mathematical 
notation used to describe the game falls into three broad categories: Discovery, 
Development, and Employment. 
1. Discovery 
Let T  be the duration of time that an exploit has existed, which we also call the 
clock time. Without loss of generality, we assume that the game starts when the exploit is 
created. We create a discrete-time model, with T increasing over the set of positive 
integers. If the exploit was part of the original system, then T  is the age of the system. If 
the exploit was introduced as part of a software upgrade, then T  is the age of the 
upgrade. Let id  be the moment in clock time that Player i discovers the exploit. We 
define max(0, )i iT d    to be the relative time that player i  has known about the 
exploit; we call this Player i’s holding time. By definition, if Player i is not aware of the 
exploit, then 0i  . We define a state of the cyber game, S , as: 
 1 2, ,S T   , 
where the elements of this three-tuple represent how long the exploit has existed, how 
long Player 1 has known the exploit, and how long Player 2 has known the exploit, 
respectively. 
2. Development 
A player’s success in cyber conflict depends on both his ability to discover 
exploits and his ability to develop effective munitions. We assume that at any moment 
following the discovery id , Player i  has the ability to create and deploy a perfectly 
effective patch. However, we assume that the act of deploying the patch effectively 
announces it to the adversary; so patching nullifies everyone’s munitions based on that 
exploit, and this ends the game for both sides. Let  ip T  denote the probability that 
Player i discovers an exploit as clock time progresses from period T  to period 1T  . For 
convenience, let    1i iq T p T  . Let  i ia  be the value of an attack by Player i using 
a munition developed using a holding time of i . The value of an attack is a function of 
  instead of T  because we assume that once the exploit is known, the effectiveness of 
the munition depends on holding time and not clock time. We impose two constraints on 
 i ia  . First, we assume ai 0 0; namely, that if an exploit is not known, then an attack 
based on it has no value. Additionally, we assume 0  ai  Bi , where iB  is an arbitrary 




Once a player has a cyber munition, he may choose to use it. Let  i T  denote 
the action set of Player i at time T. We define   { , }i T W A   where: 
 W : Wait. While a player is waiting, he is either waiting to discover the 
exploit ( i 0) or he may know about the exploit ( i 0)  and be working 
to make his munitions more effective. 
 A :Attack. When a player attacks he receives the value of his attack at 
that time. Attacking also broadcasts the attack’s underlying exploit to  
all players. 
A player who does not know the exploit has a singleton action set,  W , and a 
player that does know the exploit has the full action set,  ,W A . 
C. ZERO-SUM GAME WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 
To fully specify the game, we must define action sets for each player, and the 
utilities for player’s actions. We assume a zero-sum, strategic conflict; i.e., that any utility 
gain by one player results in an equal utility loss by the opponent. We use the convention 
that Player 1 is a maximizing player and Player 2 is a minimizing player. We assume that 
each player knows the state of the Markov game, S. But this perfect information 
assumption does not mean that a player knows the exploit. A player is still limited by his 
action set. For example, if the state of the game is ,1,0T , it means that: Player 1 knows 
the exploit, has a holding time of 1, and has an action set of  ,W A ; while Player 2 does 
not know the exploit, has a holding time of 0, and therefore has an action set of  
solely  W . 
1. Markov Game Transitions 
The discovery and development of attacks is modeled as transitions in the state of 
the Markov game. The game begins in the state 0,0,0  and proceeds in discrete rounds. 
In each round, the clock time T  increases deterministically. For each Player i, the 
holding time  i  0  until the player discovers the exploit. Exploit discovery happens with 
probability  ip T  for Player i in round T . Once an exploit is discovered by a player, the 
player’s holding time increases deterministically. The resulting transitions of the Markov 
game state are summarized in Table 1. A visual depiction of the states of the game is 
presented in Figure 1. 
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     
 
1{A,W};2 {A,W}
T ,1, 2 1 T 1,1 1, 2 1
 
Table 1. Markov game action sets and state transitions as a function of 1 2, ,T   , 
the state of the game. The game always starts in ,0,0T . As Player i  discovers the 
exploit, i , becomes greater than zero and Player i’s action set includes attack. 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of states in the Markov game. The arrows in the diagram show 
the possible transitions from one state to another, as described in Table 1. The horizontal 
axis describes increases in holding time for Player 1, 1 , and the vertical axis describes 
increases in holding time for Player 2, 2 . 
Let V T ,1, 2 define the value of the game in state 1 2, ,T   ; this value 
represents the expected value to the players if they play the game starting at that state. 
Because the game is zero sum, payoffs for both players can be described by a single 
value. To analyze the game, we seek to characterize this value function. In particular, 
0, 0, 0V  is the value of engaging in cyber conflict. We seek to characterize 1 2, ,V T  
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for every state of the Markov game. We proceed in our analysis by considering three 
cases on 1 2,  . 
2. Both Players Know the Exploit 
In this case, we have 1 20, 0    and both players have full action sets, meaning 
each may attack or wait. Table 2 represents the payoffs of the Markov game in such a 
state in matrix form. Each entry in the matrix contains a single real number, since the 
game is zero sum. If both players wait, the value is determined by future play. If one 
player attacks and the other waits, the attacking player receives the full value of his 
munition. If both players attack simultaneously, the sum of the munition values gives the 
result of the game. 
 Player 2 plays: W Player 2 plays: A 
Player 1 plays: W 1 21, 1, 1V T      2 2a   
Player 1 plays: A  1 1a      1 1 2 2a a   
Table 2. Payoff matrix for the Markov game when both players know the exploit. 
The payoff associated with “Wait, Wait” depends on the future evolution of the game. 
This leads to the following observation. 
Theorem 1. For any game state 1 2, ,T    such that 1 0   and 2 0  ,  “Attack, Attack” is 
an iterated elimination of dominated strategies equilibrium with a value of 
   1 1 2 2a a  . 
Proof. Suppose 1 21, 1, 1 0V T      . Then  1 2 2 21, 1, 1V T a      and 
     1 1 1 1 2 2a a a    . Therefore, “Attack” is a dominating strategy for Player 2. Given 
Player 2 chooses “Attack,” Player 1 must also play “Attack” and “Attack, Attack” is an 
equilibrium. A symmetric argument holds if 1 21, 1, 1 0.V T       
 
Theorem 1 results in the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. If the game starts in state 1 2, ,T   , with 1 0  and 2 0  , the game 
terminates immediately and  
    1 2 1 1 2 2, ,V T a a     . 
Interpreting the results of Theorem 1 and the above corollary, a game starting in 
,0,0 , 0T T   ends, optimally, no later than when one of the following states is reached: 
2,1,T  or 1, ,1T  . However, the game may also end earlier if a player who discovers 
the exploit chooses to attack before the second player has discovered the exploit. Because 
each i,  ·ia  has a unique, associated i , for ease of exposition we drop the index i from 
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future uses of  . For the remainder of this paper, statements like  2a   should be 
understood to mean  2 2a  . 
3. Only One Player Knows the Exploit 
For simplicity, we develop the theory from a state where Player 1 has the exploit 
and Player 2 does not. The analysis follows identical lines in the opposing situation. In 
this case, Player 1 has a full action set and Player 2 may only wait to discover the exploit 
   1 2, ,A W W   . Suppose the state of the game is , ,0T  . We define 
     2 1 2 11 1, 1,0 1, 1,1Y p T V T p T V T         
to be the expected utility if both players choose to wait at time T. Table 3 displays the 
payoffs in matrix form. 
 Player 2 Plays: Wait
Player 1 Plays: Wait Y 
Player 1 Plays: Attack  1a   
Table 3. Payoffs for the case where Player 1 knows the exploit and Player 2 
does not. By definition, Player 2 has a singleton action set and the matrix 
reduces to a single column. Player 1 prefers to attack if  1Y a  . 
The fundamental analytic question is “from which states does Player 1 prefer to 
attack?’” If Player 2 discovers the exploit, the game transitions to the scenario described 
previously and immediately concludes as specified in Theorem 1. We characterize states 
, ,0T   from which Player 1 prefers to attack as follows. We define  v h as the 
expected utility to Player 1 if he waits h time periods before attacking, starting in  
state , ,0T  . 
In particular, we have: 
 
   
            
                
      
1
2 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 2
0
1 1 1 1
2 1
· ·
· ·2 1 2 1
1· 1
v a
v q T a p T a a
v q T q T a p T q T a a









    
       
 
 





v h a h q T k a k a p T k q T j  
 
 
             . (1) 
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The definition of  v h allows us to evaluate the states from which Player 1 
prefers to attack. Player 1 prefers to attack rather than wait in state , ,0T   if and only if 
the following holds: 
      1 0a v v h     for all 1.h   (2) 
This statement mirrors our intuition that a player should attack only if an 
immediate attack results in a higher utility than waiting for any number of turns  
before attacking. 
Theorem 2. If  1a  is concave and nondecreasing, and  2p T is nondecreasing, then 
   0 1v v   implies that Player 1 should attack in state , ,0T   (i.e., Player 1 can 
never do better by waiting). 
Proof. We proceed by showing that the theorem assumptions imply that 
 (0) ( )v v h   for all 2h  . 





1 2 1 2 2 2
0 0
1
2 1 1 2 2
0
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( 1) (1)) ( ) ( )







v h v h a h q T k
a h q T k a h a p T h q T j









      
       





We know that (0) (1)v v  , which implies that 
 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
0 (1) (0)
( 1) ( ) ( ) (1)
( 1) ( ) ( ) (1),
v v
a a p T a





   
     
 
where the last inequality came from the fact that 1(·)a is concave and nondecreasing. 
Continuing with the last expression above, we have 
 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
0 ( 1) ( ) ( ) (1)
( 1) ( ) ( ) (1),
a h a h p T a
a h a h p T h a
 
 
     
        
where the last inequality came from the fact that 2(·)p is nondecreasing and 2 (1)a is 














2 1 1 2 2
0
0 ( )[ ( 1) ( ) ( ) (1)]
( 1) ( ).
h
k
q T k a h a h p T h a
v h v h 
 

       
  
  (3) 
We can complete the proof as follows: 
 
( ) (0) ( ) ( 1)
( 1) ( 2)
( 2)
(1) (0).
v h v v h v h
v h v h
v h
v v




    




Each of the paired terms on the right-hand side is smaller than zero, by  
Equation (2); thus, we have 
( ) (0) 0,v h v    
completing the proof. 
 
For the remainder of this paper, we assume stationary probabilities 
  .i ip T p T   Theorem 2 shows that v 0 v 1  is sufficient to prefer Attack at a 
holding time of , while Equation (1) shows that    0 1v v  is necessary to prefer 
Attack at  . Therefore, from state ,1,0T  Player 1 waits for     * min 0 1k kkk v v 
turns before attacking. Substituting the definition of (·),v we can write this as 
      * 1 1 2 2min 1 1kk a k a k p a    . The set in the definition of *k is never empty 
when 1(·)a is bounded, concave, and nondecreasing, and 2 2 (1)p a  is not identically zero, 
meaning that Player 1 will eventually prefer to attack. We conclude that: 
  *0,1,0 .V T v k  (4) 
While we presume that most cases will have nondecreasing 1 2 1 2, , ,a a p p functions, 
there is no reason that it must be so. Nondecreasing functions model situations where the 
passage of time brings increased capability, both in development and detection. However, 
there may be interesting, and operationally relevant, cases where the functions are 
decreasing. Although we do not present detailed results here, the value functions in these 
alternate situations may be evaluated directly by using Equations (1) and (2). 
4. Neither Player Has the Exploit 
In this case, the game has been in play for an unknown amount of time and 












Using the theory previously developed, the value of the game, given that Player 1 
discovers the exploit first, is: ,1,0V T . Similarly, if Player 2 discovers the exploit first, 
the value is: , 0,1V T . In the case where both players simultaneously discover the 
exploit:    1 2,1,1 1 1V T a a  . Because the state ,0,0T  transitions into previously 
analyzed states, we are only concerned with the first transition. For stationary discovery 





1 2 1 2
2


























p p p p p p
p pT
p p p p p p
p pT




     
    




where we have introduced the  values for brevity. 
The value of the game starting from ,0,0T  is 
     
1,0 0,1 1,1
1 * *
1,0 0 1 0,1 0 2 1
2
,1 1 2
,0,0 ,1,0 ,0,1 ,1,1
( ( 1) 1 ,)
V T V T V T V T




     (5) 
where the negative sign comes from the fact that Player 1 is a maximizing player and 
Player 2 is a minimizing player, 10 (· )v ,
*
1k denotes the results of Equations (3) and (4) if 
Player 1 is the first to discover the exploit, while 20 (·)v ,
*
2k denotes the results of Equations 
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IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we consider some concrete examples of the theory developed in 
the previous section. Unless otherwise specified, we assume ( )i ip T p T   and 0ip  . 
As a notational convenience, we denote the value of any particular example as ,nV  
where n  is the example number. 
A. SCENARIO 1: CONSTANT ia  FUNCTIONS 









   .
 
Because ( )ia   is concave and increasing for both players, we can use Theorem 2 
to compute the optimal attack time for each player, *ik for 1, 2i  , which is 1 for both 
players. We may directly compute the value of the game using Equation (5): 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 1 2
(1 ) (1) (1 ) (1) ( (1) (1)) .
(1 ) (1 )
p p a p p a p p a aV
p p p p p p
          
In particular, Player 1 has a positive expected payoff if and only if: 
   1 1 2 21 1 .p pa a  
In this case, a player may make up for a deficiency in either discovery or 
development by being strong in the other area. Because 0 1,ip   these trade-offs are 
implicitly limited. 
B. SCENARIO 2: LINEARLY INCREASING 1a  





( ) 1 5















   .
 
This function is also concave and increasing, and we may use Theorem 2 to 
determine the optimal attack time, *ik , for both players. Specifically, *2 1k   and *1k  is 
dependent on the values of 2p  and c as follows: 
 2*1








As verification, we compute the values of ( )v h  for 1,2...5h  . We see in  
Figure 2 that the maximizing value is 5h  . For example, if 2 2(1) 1, 0.2.a p   
 
Figure 2. Value of Scenario 2 from Player 1’s point of view. The vertical 
axis plots the value, ( )v h , as a function of the number of time periods 
Player 1 waits before attacking, h . The value function increases to the 
point 5h  , and decreases afterward. By Theorem 2, this implies that 
Player 1’s optimal attack time, *1k , is 5. 
Knowing *k  for both players, we may compute the value of the game, 2 ,0,0V T   
as a function of 1p ; see Figure 3. 
























Figure 3. Value of Scenario 2 as a function of Player 1’s probability of 
discovering the Exploit, 1p . Here we see that the value of the game is a 
concave function of Player 1’s probability of detecting the exploit. 
Increases in detection probability at low detection values provide a bigger 
increase in the game value than increases in detection probability at high 
detection values. 
C. SCENARIO 3: NONMONOTONE 1a  
Suppose that 2 2(1) 1, 0.3a p  , and Player 1’s value function has a single dip, 
specifically 1( ) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 3, 6, ),a    as shown in Figure 4. In this case, we cannot use 
Theorem 2 to compute the optimal attack time. However, we may compute the optimal 
attack time directly, by computing the value of holding for each possible holding period, 
as depicted in Figure 5. 




























Figure 4. The function 1a  for Scenario 3. Unlike our previous examples, the 
value of Player 1’s attack has a dip at 1 6  . In this scenario, Theorem 2 
no longer applies in finding the optimal attack time, *1k . 
Because 1( )a   is not concave and increasing, we cannot apply to Theorem 2. 
Here we need to actually compute the numeric values of ( )v h . Performing this 
calculation, we see that *1 5k   and it is not advisable to wait through the nonincreasing 
region. 
 
Figure 5. Player 1’s value as a function of waiting time, h in Scenario 3. We 
see that the payoff for waiting to 7h  is less than executing at 5h  . 




























A decision maker may want to know what value of 1(7)a  would change  
Player 1’s decision? We answer this question by performing a line search on 1(7)a  and 
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V. EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
In this section, we explore the operationally relevant implications of our model. 
A. DELAYED ACTION 
It may be the case that a player discovers an exploit and cannot take action; 
specifically, he is unable (or not allowed) to attack, patch, or work towards development 
of a munition for some predetermined fixed time after discovery of an exploit. This may 
be due to legal, policy, or organizational limitations. 
1. One Player Delayed Action 
Suppose Player 1 has a rule where he must wait w  time periods after discovery 
before any attack, patch, or development of a munition. Consistent with our previous 
definition of perfect information, if Player 2 has the exploit, he learns if Player 1 knows 
the exploit. Player 2 also knows the existence and duration of Player 1’s delay rule. 
We wish to understand the value of this delayed version of our game, which we 
denote as ·wV   . 
If both players have the exploit, Player 2 can wait and exercise his munition the 
turn before Player 1 is able to begin work; therefore, 
  2,1,1 1wV T a w  . 
If Player 2 has the exploit and Player 1 does not, Player 2 may continue 
developing his munition until Player 1 discovers the exploit, and an additional  1w  
time periods before attacking; therefore, 
    1 1 2
0
, 0,1 1 .iw
i
V T p p a i w


     
Finally, if Player 1 has the exploit and Player 2 does not, there are two 
possibilities. First, Player 1 may retain sole knowledge of the exploit until the end of the 
waiting period, or, second, Player 2 may discover the exploit during Player 1’s forced 
delay time; therefore, 
      12 2 2 2
1




V T p V T p p a w i


     . 
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We may combine these expressions to write: 
 
     




2 2 2 2
1
1 1 2 2
0







V T p V T p p a w i







       
       

  (6) 
The implication of this is that unproductive waiting times are damaging to a 
player’s prospects in cyber conflict. 
Consider the specific example of two evenly matched players with bounded, 
linear development functions; thus: 1 2 0.1p p  ,    1 2 for 0 10a a        and 
a1    a2  10 for  10 . By symmetry, , 0,0 0V T   for this game when neither 
player is forced to wait. 
Now consider the case where Player 1 has a waiting time, w . We plot Player 1’s 
expected payoff as a function of w  in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Player 1’s utility curve as a function of waiting time, ,w  against an 
evenly matched opponent. We see that Player 1’s utility drops off rapidly 
from an expected value of zero, with the implication that waiting is costly. 
We can also ask “How good does Player 1’s detection probability 1p need to be in 
order to make up for a given waiting time w ?” Figure 2 shows the adjustment required in 
this example; for waiting times longer than five periods, even perfect detection does not 
achieve parity. 




























Figure 7. Player 1’s required detection probability, 1,p required to achieve 
0,0,0 0wV  as a function of waiting time, w . Player 1’s required 
capability increases rapidly and, because 1p may never be greater than 1, 
parity is unachievable after 9.w   
The lesson of Figures 7 and 8 is that waiting times are costly and adversely affect 
one’s prospects in cyber conflict. 
B. DETERRENCE 
In the preceding subsection, we advise belligerents in cyber conflict to develop 
and execute their attacks quickly—a stance that is incompatible with the notion of “crisis 
stability” (Kent & Thayler, 1989) of classical deterrence theory. Can deterrence in cyber 
conflict be achieved and, if so, how? Several scholars ask this question, notably (Sterner, 
2011). In this paper, we consider one aspect of cyber deterrence. 
1. A Short Review of Strike Stability 
The concept of strike stability was developed during the Cold War to understand 
which sets of circumstances would lead to nuclear conflict. The original papers describe 
the development and application of this theory to nuclear arms. Kent and Thayler (1989) 
describe a game that has many similarities with the one described herein; two players are 
faced with the decision of “attacking” or “not attacking.” They make this decision by 
weighing the benefits of going “first” or “second,” with the assumption that the other 
player will surely retaliate with whatever force he has left. The closer the ratio of costs of 
going second to going first is to one, the more stable the system is because the decision 
maker is indifferent to striking first or striking second and may be deterred. Low values 
of strike stability indicate a large disadvantage to attacking second and therefore lead to 



















instability. Deterrence requires both sides to choose non-action (“Wait” in our model) at 
each decision epoch. 
2. Strike Stability for Cyber Conflict 
The analysis of Section 4 shows that if a player has the ability to attack, he 
eventually does with certainty. This means that cyber conflict with perfect information 
and a single exploit is deterrence unstable. Intuitively, this is because there is no second 
strike. Theorem 1 is sufficient to demonstrate that the single-attack case is deterrence 
unstable; the first player to attack receives the reward of his development to date, and the 
nonattacking player is left with an empty arsenal. 
Other considerations may provide some degree of deterrence in reality. For 
example, military, economic, or diplomatic consequences, or large cyber munition 
arsenals, may provide some guarantee of a second strike. Such guarantees, while 
important to deterrence, are outside the bounds of our current work. Nevertheless, 
without these external guarantees, deterrence in cyber conflict does not exist. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have developed and exercised a limited, stylized model. Real situations, of 
course, have many differences from the idealized mathematics; the utility of this work is 
to define the cyber conflict problem with perfect information. Additionally, we: 
 Demonstrate a framework for analyzing the problem; 
 Demonstrate that in cyber conflict, idle wait times are damaging, and 
provide a means to calculate their disutility; and 
 Show implications for deterrence in cyber conflict. 
This paper considered a single attack in discrete time with perfect information—
three idealizations that help us begin to tackle the problem of cyber conflict. Of these 
three, the perfect information assumption appears to be the richest area to explore in the 
future, and with this exploration come considerations of credibility, reputations, and  
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